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tax notes state
The Ordinary Diet of the Law:
How to Interpret Public Law 86-272
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
Public Law 86-272 is an important feature of
the landscape of both state corporate income
2
taxation and state tax policy more generally. The
Multistate Tax Commission is completing an
important project on updating the guidance
given to taxpayers regarding compliance with
P.L. 86-272.3 We plan to discuss some key
features of this planned guidance in a future
article (or perhaps articles). But first we will
discuss the overall interpretive rubric that
should be used for P.L. 86-272.
I. Some Quick Background
Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors argue that a proper, fair
reading of Public Law 86-272 should not
involve expanding its coverage to protect
business practices that differ from the practices
that Congress specifically intended to protect at
the time of the statute’s enactment.
Indeed, in today’s world, filled with legal
complexity, the true test of federalist
principle may lie, not in the occasional
constitutional effort to trim Congress’
commerce power at its edges, or to
protect a State’s treasury from a private
damages action, but rather in those many
statutory cases where courts interpret the
mass of technical detail that is the
1
ordinary diet of the law.

P.L. 86-272 protects taxpayers from state
4
income taxation if certain criteria are met. Those
criteria include not having an office in the state
and only selling tangible personal property. For
purposes of the MTC project, the most important
criterion is that a taxpayer is protected if it
engages only in “solicitation” in the state.
However, the statute itself offers little direct
guidance on what solicitation means. Nor is
such guidance to be found in the legislative
history. This has long been recognized as an
5
important problem.

2

Just how important a feature is, in fact, a hard question to answer.
See Dan R. Bucks et al., “Public Law 86-272: Still Bad Policy After 60
Years,” Tax Notes State, Oct. 7, 2019, p. 13, 16-18. For a fuller discussion —
and critique — of P.L. 86-272, see Michael T. Fatale, “Federalism and
State Business Activity Tax Nexus: Revisiting Public Law 86-272,” 21 Va.
Tax Rev. 435 (2002).
3

Multistate Tax Commission, “P.L. 86-272 Statement of Information
Work Group.”
4

1

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).

15 U.S.C. section 381.

5

See, e.g., Paul J. Hartman, “State Taxation of Corporate Income From
a Multistate Business,” 13 Vand. L. Rev. 21, 47 (1959).
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Today, the primary source of authority for
interpreting solicitation is the 1992 Supreme
6
Court opinion in Wrigley written by Justice
Antonin Scalia. In that opinion, Scalia largely
eschewed legislative history and instead started
with a dictionary “to ascertain the fair meaning”
7
of solicitation.
Specifically, Scalia found that solicitation
encompassed “those activities that are entirely
ancillary to requests for purchases — those that
serve no independent business function apart
from their connection to the soliciting of orders —
[in contrast to] those activities that the company
would have reason to engage in anyway but
8
chooses to allocate to its in-state sales force.”
Scalia illustrated the distinction by way of
examples, explaining that “employing salesmen
to repair or service the company’s products is not
part of the ‘solicitation of orders,’ since there is
good reason to get that done whether or not the
9
company has a sales force.”
Yet now, in 2020, some repairs can be done
over the internet. Should this change in
technology mean that such in-state services do not
go beyond solicitation?10 The result of such an
interpretation would be to let technological
advancements effectively expand the scope of
“solicitation” and create an ever larger “tax free”
zone. The MTC guidelines are premised on the
notion that this is not the correct way to interpret
the law. Accordingly, one of the proposed
guidelines explains that if “the business regularly
provides post-sale assistance to in-state customers
(i.e., advice on how to use a product after the
product has been delivered to the customer) via

either electronic chat or email that customers
initiate by clicking on an icon on the business’s
website,” then the business loses the protection of
11
P.L. 86-272.
II. A Matter of Interpretation
There is another way of looking at matters, of
course. We just characterized the MTC approach
as not letting technology expand the concept of
solicitation. Others take the perspective that the
MTC approach is narrowing the legitimate reach
12
of P.L. 86-272. No doubt there can be arguments
in specific cases about what constitutes
solicitation, but we see this counterargument as
primarily a legislative intent or purpose-based
argument. The argument has some appeal.
Congress meant to set up a minimum standard of
nexus with P.L. 86-272 and narrowing the
definition of “solicitation” would seem to
puncture this minimum.
However, this surface appeal disappears upon
closer inspection. This is for reasons that we will
now explain.
First, Congress did not, in fact, write a statute
that imposed a minimum standard. Rather,
Congress wrote a statute that created a minimum
through a set of rules. That is, Congress passed
specific protections — protections that traced
then-current business practices that had come to
Congress’s attention through court cases.13
Indeed, the statute Congress passed would not
even protect the taxpayer at issue in the main
Supreme Court decision that precipitated the

11

MTC, “Statement of Information Concerning Practices of Multistate
Tax Commission and Signatory States Under Public Law 86-272,”
Example 2 (Feb. 14, 2020).
12

6

Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley Jr. Co., 505 U.S.
214 (1992).
7
8
9

Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 229.

10

This is also why the word “within” in P.L. 86-272 cannot bear the
interpretive weight that some commentators place upon it. See Martin I.
Eisenstein and David W. Bertoni, “Wayfair Misused: States and Cities
Seek to Expand Their Tax Powers,” Tax Notes State, Dec. 16, 2019, p. 891,
896-97. To be sure, the nonprotected activities must occur within the
state, but when, for example, an item is repaired in the state by means of
the internet there is a powerful argument that that activity is in the state.

162

See presentation by Philip Tatarowicz linked to in Amy Hamilton,
“Tatarowicz Sharply Critical of MTC Project on P.L. 86-272,” Tax Notes
State, Dec. 23, 2019, p. 1190, at slide 44 (“From an income tax nexus
perspective, if the tools of efficiency created by E-Commerce are
weaponized by States going wild to expand their tax reach, P.L. 86-272
will be emasculated; thus, turning away from Congressional intent.”);
Christopher T. Lutz, “What to Do With Public Law 86-272,” Tax Notes
State, Dec. 23, 2019, p. 1071, 1072 (“I’m not so sure the MTC’s Uniformity
Committee is really geared to faithfully construe the text and purpose of
P.L. 86-272”); David W. Bertoni, David Swetnam-Burland, and Jamie
Szal, “Crossfire Hurricane: Perils in a Post-Wayfair World,” Tax Notes
State, Mar. 16, 2020, p. 937, 942 (“Under the mantra of bringing P.L. 86272 into the modern era, the working group of the MTC has lost sight of
the fundamental purpose of this federal statute and the protection it
provides.”).
13

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 86-936 at 1 (1959). The three cases are:
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 454
(1959); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651
(1958); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279 (1958).
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whole crisis — Northwestern Portland. This is
because a taxpayer loses the protection of P.L. 86272 if it maintains an office in the state, and the
taxpayer in Northwestern Portland had an office in
the taxing state.
The version of the bill referred out of the
Senate Finance Committee did protect businesses
with an office in state if they just engaged in
14
solicitation, and would have covered the
Northwestern Portland fact pattern. Yet the bill was
amended on the Senate floor and, by a vote of 6515
29, this provision was eliminated. Given that
Congress pared the law back not even to cover the
three central business scenarios before it, but
rather only two, it is non-persuasive to argue that
Congress intended the bill to protect further
business patterns then completely unimaginable.
Second, a corollary of this point is that it is
generally not proper statutory interpretation to
argue that Congress’s intent to protect specific
business patterns should apply to other arguably
similar business patterns, just because doing
otherwise would make the statute less relevant to
modern circumstances. For instance, imagine that
Congress passed a law to protect buggy whip
manufacturers and never repealed that law.
Would that mean that there is now an
interpretative imperative to protect other
16
transportation-related manufacturers? No! The
goal of protecting buggy whip manufacturers
might well have been motivated by special
interest concerns of the time or a desire to slow the
transitionary displacement caused by
technological changes (like the spread of
automobiles). Put another way, just because
Congress passed a statute 60 years ago with two
fact patterns in mind, and with the language of
the statute reflecting concerns related to those two
fact patterns, in no way implies that the statute

was meant to serve a broader purpose. If those
fact patterns are far less important today, then it
should be up to Congress to decide how to update
the statute or whether to do so at all.
Third, the legislative history indicates that
Congress did not intend P.L. 86-272’s protections
to extend to near substitutes of the specific forms
of business explicitly protected, including a case
rather analogous to the ones we are now
considering. That is, in its report on P.L. 86-272,
the Willis Committee explained that it did not
consider that “Operation of mobile stores in the
State” was an activity that was intended to be
17
protected by the statute. To be sure, the Willis
Committee report postdates the enactment of P.L.
86-272, but it is fairly close in time and the whole
point of this section of the report was to consider
18
whether Congress should retain P.L. 86-272. A
mobile store in the state would seem to be a fair
1960s description of what the modern internet
effectively enables.
Fourth, the problem Congress aimed to
legislate against with P.L. 86-272 has mostly gone
away with time, which further weighs against a
sweeping interpretation of the statute. Congress
legislated P.L. 86-272 out of fear that the Supreme
Court might not set an appropriate minimum for
nexus.19 Today, that fear is unfounded. In fact, the
protections offered by current constitutional
jurisprudence are often greater than those offered
by P.L. 86-272. Most obviously, this is because the
constitutional “substantial nexus” standard
protects all taxpayers, even sellers of services,
from all taxes.
But even as to just the income tax the
constitutional standard will often be higher. A
relatively small taxpayer can lose the P.L. 86-272
protection for minor in-state activities, such as
engaging in $10,000 in sales that are not fulfilled
out of state. This level of nexus is probably not

14

S. Rep. No. 86-658 at 6 (1959).

15

105 Cong. Rec. 16470, 16477 (1959).

16

And so, at least as to P.L. 86-272, we agree with Bertoni et al. that
“the words of a tax statute enacted in the 1950s must have the meaning
that was intended when it was enacted, and not be given some gloss that
rests on a radically different economy and modalities of commerce that
came into existence many decades later.” Bertoni, Swetnam-Burland,
and Szal, supra note 12, at 943. Perplexingly, the authors claim that this
argument indicates that there is something amiss in the MTC’s project.
This is apparently because of their overreading of the word “within.” See
supra note 10. Again, we argue that extending solicitation to include
interactive websites is to give an old statute a radical new gloss and not
the reverse.

17

H. Rep. No. 88-1480 at 427 (1964).

18

Treating this report as part of P.L. 86-272’s legislative history is
quite common. See, for example, Tatarowicz, supra note 12, slide 53.
19

See, e.g., S. Rep. 86-658 at 4; and H. Rep. No. 88-1480 at 438.
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going to qualify as substantial under Wayfair.
Moreover, many states have bright-line factor
standards that are comfortably above the
20
constitutional minimum.
Further, the Court in Wayfair made clear that
21
Pike balancing applies on top of the substantial
22
nexus test. Thus, a taxpayer confronting a
particularly onerous state tax regime today has
another available remedy. And because Pike
balancing is a balancing test, burdens that loom
larger for smaller businesses will be harder to
justify. With the mischief Congress tried to solve
through P.L. 86-272 thus largely resolved by
subsequent judicial decisions, purpose-based
arguments for expanding P.L. 86-272 have little
analytic purchase.
We think that this is the primary significance
of Wayfair as to P.L. 86-272. But Wayfair is also
relevant in that not one member of the Court in
Wayfair had anything nice to say about the formal,
23
physical presence test from Quill. Indeed, the
majority, in a key passage, discussed the
importance of “virtual contacts” in potentially
24
creating nexus in the modern economy. The
dissent did not dispute this so much as argue that
the great increase in e-commerce indicates that
the Court should not intercede because of the
unpredictable result of fixing its error. Note that
from our perspective, “modernizing” P.L. 86-272
so it would exempt new forms of commerce

would be to repeat the sins of Quill and, also, of
Wayfair as understood by the dissent.25
Fifth, a fundamental ground rule in our
constitutional system is that preemptions of
traditional state powers should be construed
26
narrowly. It is true that much of the development
of this doctrine postdates P.L. 86-272 (not that this
has stopped the Court from applying it to earlier
statutes), but there was definitely precedent to
this effect before 1959.27 A canon is only an
interpretive guide that can make more or less
sense to apply in a given context. Yet here we
would argue this canon is particularly apt because
it correctly addresses a deep structural issue
28
underlying our federal system. Through the lens
of this canon, Congress should be understood as
having made a limited incursion into state taxing
power with P.L. 86-272, to solve a then-current
problem. The alternative view has Congress
creating a shelter from state taxation limited only
by the ingenuity of tax lawyers to analogize
current business models to the ones before
Congress in 1959. It is useful to remember here
that Congress could have, but did not, pass a
broad nexus standard and thus that this canon is
consonant with the text of the statute.
Note that our argument relying on the canon
against preemption here is, in a sense, subtle. In

25

Id. at 2104 (“The Court is of course correct that the Nation’s
economy has changed dramatically since the time that Bellas Hess and
Quill roamed the earth. I fear the Court today is compounding its past
error by trying to fix it in a totally different era.”) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
26

20

It is thus wholly appropriate for new guidance from the MTC to
include its model factor presence standard as an addendum. Brian
Hamer of the MTC makes the same point. See Hamilton, “Factor
Presence Nexus Thresholds Way to Protect Small Sellers,” Tax Notes
State, Mar. 16, 2020, p. 992.
21

Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

22

South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099
(2018). For further discussion, see Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske,
and David Gamage, “Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden,”
State Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 447.
23

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

24

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (“A virtual showroom can show far more
inventory, in far more detail, and with greater opportunities for
consumer and seller interaction than might be possible for local stores.
Yet the continuous and pervasive virtual presence of retailers today is,
under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should not maintain a rule
that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the State.”).

164

See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“We
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.”). See also California State Board of
Equalization v. Sierra Summit Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 851-52 (1989) (“Although
Congress can confer an immunity from state taxation, we have stated
that [a] court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an
exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed.”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Florida
Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 48, 50 (2008)
(following Sierra Summit). For further discussion, see Shanske, “States
Can and Should Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law,” 45 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 543 (2019).
27

It is also true that the canon has not been applied consistently, but
that does not mean that it should not be. For a persuasive argument to
this effect, see Ernest A. Young, “‘The Ordinary Diet of the Law’: The
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court,” 2011(1) Sup. Ct.
Rev. 253, 344 (Jan. 2012) (“The presumption against preemption may be
the last best hope for preserving a meaningful measure of state
autonomy in our constitutional system.”).
28

Following Llewellyn, the key to applying a canon correctly is
“situation sense.” Karl Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed,” 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950).
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Heublein, the Supreme Court’s first P.L. 86-272
case, this presumption was used to avoid an
29
expansive interpretation of P.L. 86-272. In
Wrigley, the states argued that this same
presumption should lead to solicitation being
interpreted narrowly. Scalia rejected that
argument because, as to solicitation, Congress did
clearly intend to preempt the states and so what
was required was only a fair interpretation of
what Congress actually wrote. But the situation
before us today is more like Heublein than Wrigley.
This is because at least some of the activities that
taxpayers engage in through their websites are
plainly more than entirely ancillary to solicitation
and have been understood to be such since well
before Wrigley. Thus, the critics of updating the
guidelines are, as in Heublein, arguing for an
extension of the protection offered by P.L. 86-272.
III. Conclusion
None of the foregoing necessarily supports
the details of the MTC’s approach. We will thus
return to analyzing those details in a future article
or articles. Our goal here has been to clear away
the interpretive underbrush. P.L. 86-272 is a
poorly drafted, 60-year-old statute that
specifically protects 60-year-old business
practices. Consequently, we have argued here that
a proper, fair reading of the statute should not
involve expanding its coverage to protect current
business practices that differ from those Congress
specifically meant to protect when enacting P.L.
86-272.


29

Heublein Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 409 U.S. 275, 281-82
(1972).
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